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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
amounts for a particular period paid pursuant to either order shall be
credited to either amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under
both. 4 3
There appears to be, however, no such impediment in a proceeding to establish
a foreign support decree as a local judgment.
The provisions for registration apparently do not provide a remedy for the
awkward position in which the Missouri courts have placed themselves when an
obligee who has moved out of the state attempts to enforce a support order
through a second court in another part of the rendering state. This assumes, of
course, that our courts will feel bound to follow the unfortunate decision in the
Welch case.14' If, however, that decision were not followed, and it should be de-
cided that an obigee could petition for support in a Missouri court other than
the one which had previously rendered the support decree, there is no reason why
the obligee could not "register" the prior judgment in another Missouri court. In
such a situation, though, there still remain the questions as to whether the second
court can modify a sister court's decree as to the amounts payable, and whether
it can cite the defendant for contempt.14,5
JAMEs H. McLARNEy
RECENT HAPPENINGS IN THE AREA OF ALIMONY AND CHILD
SUPPORT
This article will survey the recent Missouri decisions in the area of permanent
alimony and child support. The correlation between the two areas will be con-
sidered, as well as the contrasts. The writer's main purpose will be to relate the
recent court holdings to the established law, and to comment as to the effect of
the one upon the other.
I. PERMANENT ALIMONY
A. Comparison of Ecclesiastical and Statutory Systems
"Under the canonical law administered by the ecclesiastical courts, marriage
was a religious sacrament . . . ."- The courts lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a mar-
riage for postnuptial cause, and the only relief that they could grant was a divorce
from bed and board. Such a divorce was a mere judicial separation; the marital
status remained, as did the husband's marital obligation to support his wife.2
Under Missouri law, marriage is not treated as a sacrament, but as a contract
143. § 454.280, RSMo 1959.
144. Welch v. McIntosh, supra note 99, and accompanying textual material.
145. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Briggs, supra note 104,
at 55.
1. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 420, 221 S.W. 1066, 1068 (1920) (en banc).
2. State ex rel. Couplin v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 770, 129 S.W.2d 1 (1939) (en
banc); Nelson v. Nelson, supra note 1.
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between the husband and wife. 3 As a contract it may be dissolved by court order.4
When the -marital status is dissolved, the theory of the husband's continuing obliga-
tion which was present in the ecclesiastical courts no longer has much validity.
Statutory alimony has filled much of the space formerly occupied by the con-
tinuing obligation of the husband.5 This statutory liability incident to absolute
divorce was created in the interest of social welfare and justice.6 The nature of the
statutory obligation "is the allowance of such a sum of money in gross or install-
ments as will fairly and reasonably compensate [the wife] for the loss of her support
by the annulment of the marriage contract." 7
B. Factors in Determining Permanent Alimony
Alimony will be granted only to the wife and only when she is the innocent
and injured party.8 But even when the wife is innocent and injured, the court is
not compelled to grant her alimony. 9 Section 452.070 of the 1959 Missouri Revised
Statutes provides in part that "the court shall make such order touching the
alimony ...as, from the crcumstances of the parties and the nature of the case,
shall be reasonable."'10 (Emphasis added.) The statute has been interpreted to mean
that there may be situations in which it would not be reasonable to grant alimony.-
3. Smith v. Smith, 350 Mo. 104, 164 S.W.2d 921 (1942); Nelson v. Nelson,
supra note 1.
4. § 452.010, RSMo 1959.
5. Section 452.070, RSMo 1959, provides:
When a divorce shall be adjudged, the court shall make such order touch-
ing the alimony and maintenance of the wife, and the care, custody
and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as, from the cir-
cumstances of the parties and the nature of the case, shall be reason-
able, and when the wife is plaintiff, may order the defendant to give
security for such alimony and maintenance; and upon his neglect to give
the security required by him, or upon default of himself or his sureties,
if any there be, to pay or provide such alimony and maintenance, may
award an execution for the collection thereof, or enforce the performance
of the judgment or order by sequestration of property, or by such other
lawful ways and means as is according to the practice of the court. The
court, on the application of either party, may make such alteration,
from time to time, as to the allowance of alimony and maintenance, as
may be proper....
6. Smith v. Smith, supra note 3, at 108, 164 S.W.2d at 923.
7. Nelson v. Nelson, supra note 1, at 421, 221 S.W. at 1069.
In Smith v. Smith, supra note 6, at 109, 164 S.W.2d at 924, the court ad-
mitted that there was some confusion in the Missouri courts as to this point.
"This Court has said [that] an allowance of alimony is in the nature of an
award for damages because of the husband's breach of the marriage contract, but
our courts of appeals have leaned to the theory of a continuing duty to support."
Since the Smith case, however, courts of this state have consistently treated
the award as one of damages.
8. § 452.090, RSMo 1959; Willis v. Willis, 274 S.W.2d 261 (Spr. Ct. App.
1954); Slaughter v. Slaughter, 106 Mo. App. 104, 80 S.W. 3 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904).
9. Smith v. Smith, supra note 3.
10. § 452.070, RSMo 1959.
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The courts of this state have repeatedly said that the factors to be considered
in determining alimony are:
IT]he financial status of the respective parties, including the question of
their individual estates, incomes, obligations, and necessities; the contribu-
tion of each to the accumulated property; the probable future prospects
of each; their respective ages, health, and ability to follow gainful occupa-
tions; their stations in life; their children, if any; the duration of the
marriage, and whether it was one of affection or convenience; and the
conduct of the parties, with particular regard to the cause of the divorce
and the relative and comparative responsibility of each other therefore.12
The duty of weighing these factors and making the determination rests with the
discretion of the trial court, and it is only in a case where the court abuses this
discretion that the decree will be set aside.13 The circumstances and needs which
the court will weigh are those present at the time of the divorce decree.' 4
It would seem that when the wife is the innocent and injured party, a court
should investigate thoroughly before it determines that she is not entitled to
permanent alimony. Once the court makes such a determination it forecloses the
rights of the wife, regardless of any later change in her needs.15 If, however, when
in doubt a nominal allowance is granted (one dollar per month, for example), then
the decree will allow the court to later re-examine the conditions and needs of the
parties.
C. Treatment on tire Appellate Level
When a question of alimony is raised on appeal, the appellate courts will hear
the case de novo and examine the whole record.16 Due deference will be given to
the trial court's determination, for it will have had an opportunity to hear and
observe the witnesses as they testified. 7
In a recent St. Louis Court of Appeals case,' 8 the husband contended that the
award of alimony in the lower court was excessive.' 9 The wife argued that an
award of alimony, considered in modern usage as an assessment of damages for
the breach of the marriage contract, should be left to the discretion of the trial
court.2 0 The court stated that while in Nelson v. Nelson.2 ' the term "assessment of
damages" was mentioned, what was there said was that in a "limited sense at least
12. Spivack v. Spivack, 283 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955); Simmons
v. Simmons, 280 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955).
13. Brinker v. Brinker, 360 Mo. 212, 227 S.W.2d 724 (1950); Fields v.
Fields, 343 S.W.2d 168 (K.C. Ct. App. 1960).
14. Smith v. Smith, supra note 3.
15. Ballew v. Ballew, supra note 11; Smith v. Smith, supra note 3.
16. Coggbum v. Coggburn, 256 S.W.2d 836 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953); Fossett v.
Fossett, 243 S.W.2d 625 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
17. Ibid.
18. Coleman v. Coleman, 318 S.W.2d 378 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
19. He earned approximately $333.66 per month, and the payments amounted
to $285.00, leaving him $48.66 per month to live on.
20. Coleman v. Coleman, supra note 18, at 382.
21. Supra note 1.
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it may be deemed an assessment of damages,"22 qualified by the factors to be
given consideration in measuring damages. 23 So, even though the courts have
changed their view as to why alimony is granted, it seems clear that the weighing
procedure is still the same.
D. Incidents of a Money Judgment
A judgment for alimony is subject to the same incidents as any other judgment
rendered in an action at law, and since it may be considered compensation awarded
in redress of a legal injury, it has been held that the wife has a property right in
the money judgment which vests as the installments accrue.24
In a recent modification proceeding,25 the trial judge ordered that the husband
pay the wife her already accrued alimony of 300 dollars in equal installments of 75
dollars, payment to be made on September 1, 1956, 1957, 1958, and 1959. On appeal,
the court reversed the order, stating that the wife had a vested property interest in
the judgment and that the trial court could not impair her vested right by post-
poning its payment.26
Garnishment in aid of execution may be used to collect accrued installments
of an alimony decree.27 When execution is issued on the alimony judgment, it will
be subject to the ten year statutory provision concerning presumption of payment.28
In fact, it has been held that after the alimony decree has laid dormant for ten
years it may not be modified,2 9 there being nothing for the court to modify.
E. Modification of Permanent Alimony
When permanent alimony is granted to the wife it may be in gross, 0 or in
monthly or yearly installments. If the trial court grants alimony in gross, then
the only method of modification is through direct appeal.3' Monthly or yearly
installment alimony, however, is subject to "alteration from time to time . . . as
may be proper .... ',32 This provision affords the court an opportunity, as new
conditions arise, to determine more exactly the extent of the loss suffered by the
wife. 33
22. Coleman v. Coleman, supra note 18, at 382.
23. Supra note 12, and accompanying textual material.
24. Nelson v. Nelson, supra note 1, at 423, 211 S.W. at 1069.
25. Hughes v. Wagner, 303 S.W.2d 181 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
26. Id. at 185.
27. Harrison v. Harrison, 339 S.W.2d 509 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960).
28. Section 516.350, RSMo 1959, provides in part: "Every judgment . . .
of any court of record . . . of this . . . state . . . shall be presumed to be paid
and satisfied after the expiration of ten years . . . See Mayes v. Mayes, 342 Mo.
401, 116 S.W.2d 1 (1938).
29. Sisco v. Sisco, 339 S.W.2d 283 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960). For more extended
comment upon this case, see Recent Case Notes, this issue, Missouri Law Review.
30. It will be noted that gross alimony may be payable over a period, as
with a grant of $3,000.00 gross alimony, payable at $300.00 per year for ten years.
31. Carl v. Carl, 284 S.W.2d 41 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955).
32. § 452.070, RSMo 1959.
33. Nelson v. Nelson, supra note 1, at 422, 221 S.W. at 1069.
19621
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1. Change of Condition
The authority to modify a judgment for alimony is dependent upon proof of
a change in conditions subsequent to the time of the decree. This necessity is
created by the fact that the original judgment for alimony is res judicata as to
all the facts and conditions bearing upon the award and existing at the date of its
rendition. 34 Since the amount of alimony is determined by "nicely balancing be-
tween the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay,"' 5 it would
seem at first glance that a substantial change in either element would authorize a
redetermination. However, a question arises as to whether an increase in the hus-
band's income, after the decree, should benefit his erstwhile wife. It must be re-
membered that the wife voluntarily assumed the status of an unmarried woman
and that she has contributed nothing to the husband's acquisition of wealth after
the entry of the divorce decree.36 Therefore, unless the wife can show an increased
cost in maintaining that station of life enjoyed by her at the time of the divorce,
the single fact that the husband has enlarged his income will be immaterial.3 7 If
the wife can also show a change in her position, then the modification will be
granted.38
2. The Self-Imposed Change of Condition
When a court determines that the party asking for the modification is the
party that has created the changed condition, it will generally dismiss the motion.
A good example of the above rule is found when the husband falls behind in his
alimony payments and as a consequence the wife is forced to take employment
to support herself and her child.39 In such a case courts usually hold that the
husband's improper conduct has caused the changed condition and, therefore,
that the change should be ignored.40
When an ex-wife went into debt to purchase a farm, it was said that such
a change of condition would not entitle her to more alimony.41 In another case, the
court seemed to say that when the ex-husband decreases his income as a result
of improvident acts, the request for modification should be denied.42 It could be
argued that in many cases a simple decrease in the husband's income should not
by itself be grounds for modification of the decree. This is because the wife is
still entitled to be maintained according to the station of life which she enjoyed
"at the time the decree was granted,"'43 and a subsequent decrease in the husband's
income has no effect upon that standard.
34. Adkins v. Adkins, 325 S.W.2d 364 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959); Shilkett v.
Shilkett, 285 S.W.2d 67 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955).
35. Adkins v. Adkins, supra note 34, at 367.
36. Harriman v. Harriman, 281 S.W.2d 566, 570 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955).
37. Adkins v. Adkins, supra note 34; Harriman v. Harriman, supra note 36.
38. Harriman v. Harriman, supra note 36, at 571.
39. Jourdan v. Jourdan, 251 S.W.2d 380 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
40. Id. at 384.
41. Adkins v. Adkins, supra note 34.
42. Shilkett v. Shilkett, supra note 34.
43. Harriman v. Harriman, supra note 36, at 570. (Emphasis added.)
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If the ex-wife remarries, the husband is relieved from further payment.4 '
What if the ex-husband remarries? The courts of this state have been consistent
in holding that the remarriage of the husband, by itself, does not constitute a suf-
ficient change.45 When, however, the husband's remarriage is coupled with the
birth of a child in the second marriage, the courts will recognize the change of
condition.46
3. Equitable Quality of Modification
Even though the courts speak of the divorce decree as being a statutory
judgment at law, the divorcing court still retains powers which are equitable in
nature.4 7 Therefore, the trial courts are allowed to qualify their modifications
upon certain conditions. In State ex rel. Couplin v. Hostetter,48 the court granted
a modification of an earlier alimony decree upon the condition that all back
alimony then due be paid before a certain date. Recently, in Link v. Link 0 the
discretion of imposing a condition in a custody proceeding was also sanctioned.
In that case, the trial court had refused to hear the modification proceeding
until the ex-husband brought his alimony and child support payments up to date.
The appellate court approved, but did caution the use of the latter proceeding,
saying that it should be used "only after sufficient inquiry has been made into
the status of the child to satisfy the court that the child's best welfare will not be
prejudiced."5 o
II. CHILD SuroT
In a situation where there has been a divorce with custody of children going
to the wife, and the decree fails to grant child support, the wife has two rem-
edies available.51 The first remedy is based upon the husband's common law duty
and obligation to support his minor children. 52 The wife is entitled, through an
independent action, to recover for expenses already incurred.5 3 The second remedy
is dependent upon the alimony and child support statute, in that the wife may
proceed in the divorce case, by motion or otherwise, to obtain an order providing
44. § 452.075, RSMo 1959.
45. Jourdan v. Jourdan, supra note 39; Shapiro v. Shapiro, 238 S.W.2d 886
(St. L. Ct. App. 1951).
46. Ibid.
47. Franklin v. Franklin, 283 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1955) (en banc); State ex
rel. Couplin v. Hostetter, supra note 2; Arnold v. Arnold, 222 S.W. 996 (Mo. 1920)
(en banc).
48. Supra note 2.
49. 262 S.W.2d 318 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds.
50. Id. at 320.
51. Kelly v. Kelly, 329 Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932) (en banc).
52. Lodahal v. Papenberg, 277 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Mo. 1955); Kelly v. Kelly,
supra note 51, at 998, 47 S.W.2d at 764.
53. Lodahal v. Papenberg, supra note 52, at 551; Kelly v. Kelly, supra note
51, at 1000, 47 S.W.2d at 765.
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for future support." The two remedies are not in the alternative but are coterm-
inous, and their use will depend upon the facts in the particular case. 55
In Roberts v. Roberts, 6 the wife was granted custody of the child in a divorce
proceeding. The decree did not provide for child support, and the wife prayed
for an order modifying the original decree so that it would include child support.
The trial court granted her forty dollars per month. The husband appealed, claim-
ing that a modification of the decree must be based upon a change in circumstances
and that all parties admitted there had been none. The appellate court upheld
the lower court on the ground that the relief was really of the second type men-
tioned above. It was stated that the relief prayed for was not in reality a motion
to modify, "but [was] a motion, ancillary to the main cause, requesting that the
court determine as an original adjudication that which should have been adjudged
at the outset. '5 7
The common law obligation of the husband is limited to expenses incurred
for necessaries, which include food, lodging, clothing, medical attention, tuition
and school books.s8 Beyond these, "in nearly every family some comforts in excess
of the strict necessities of life are enjoyed and treated as necessaries."' 59
A. The Child Support Statute60
1. Purpose
The basic considerations behind the adoption of Missouri's child support act
have been stated by the Missouri Supreme Court as follows:
[T]he apparent purpose of the [child support] statute is to provide a
mode of procedure for obtaining maintenance of the child and for de-
termining in advance the extent of the common-law obligation of the
father, as well as to provide the means of enforcing the obligation. The
simplified statutory procedure (enacted in the public welfare and looking
to the security of the child during infancy) is designed to obviate the
expense and delay of independent actions.61
2. Factors in Determining Child Support
A trial court applies the same balancing factors in determining child support
as are applied in determining permanent alimony; i.e., "health, age, needs, obli-
gations, dependents, income and the capacity to produce income of parties." z2
54. Lodahal v. Papenberg, supra note 52, at 551; Kelly v. Kelly, supra note
51, at 1001, 47 S.W.2d at 766.
55. Lodahal v. Papenberg, supra note 52, at 551; Kelly v. Kelly, supra note
51, at 1003, 47 S.W.2d at 767.
56. 292 S.W.2d 596 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956).
57. Id. at 598.
58. Josey v. Forde, 338 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1960); Gately Outfitting Co. v.
Vinson, 182 S.W. 133 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916).
59. Gately Outfitting Co. v. Vinson, supraT note 58, at 134.
60. § 452.070, RSMo 1959.
61. Lodahal v. Papenberg, supra note 52, at 551.
62. Smith v. Smith, 350 Mo. 104, 164 S.W.2d 921 (1942); Ballew v. Ballew,
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In Sellars v. Sellars,3 the Springfield Court of Appeals gave recognition to
the fact that a father's financial ability may not be sufficient to satisfy the needs
of both the children and the father. The circuit court had awarded the wife
eighty dollars per month child support. The court admitted that eighty dollars
was certainly not in excess of the children's needs. The amount was so inconsist-
ent with the husband's income (he had earned only 1,500 dollars in 1952), how-
ever, that an enforcement of the award would probably have destroyed his in-
centive and defeated the purpose to be accomplished.6 4 The appellate court, acting
de novo, reduced the support decree to fifty dollars per month.
In determining the husband's ability to pay, a court will look to his financial
worth, including his real and personal property. This point was made quite clear
in Wonneman v. Wonnemwan.65 The wife, in a proceeding for modification"6 of
child support, was awarded an increase from 120 dollars per month to 200 dollars
per month. One of the grounds upon which the husband appealed was the failure
of the wife to show that his income was sufficient to justify the increase. The
court admitted that, from the husband's testimony, his income would be insuf-
ficient to withstand the increase. But current income is only one part of a man's
financial worth. The husband had disclosed that he had a total net worth of ap-
proximately 58,000 dollars. The court stated that as long as he was primarily liable
for the support of his children, and had property sufficient to meet their needs,
then the children
should not be deprived of a decent home and adequate support. . . . [I]t
is better that [the children] be properly maintained and educated dur-
ing their tender years than to be left an inheritance preserved at the ex-
pense of their present needs and comfort.67
B. Incidents of a Money Judgment
Child support judgments and alimony judgments are treated in the same
fashion.68 Therefore, what was earlier said concerning alimony is applicable here.
In Sisco v. Sisco,69 a distinction was argued at the trial level, but was discarded
on appeal. The trial court granted modification of a child support decree after the
ten year judgment statute had run.70 The decision surmised that the trial court's
theory of jurisdiction was that of continuing control during the minority of the
children. The appellate court said that the power to modify "implies something
in existence to be changed or altered,"l1 and refused to accept an analogy be-
63. 274 S.W.2d 509 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955).
64. Id. at 513.
65. 305 S.W.2d 71 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
66. The right of modification is based upon the same statutory language as is
alimony; § 452.070, RSMo 1959.
67. Wonneman v. Wonneman, supra note 65, at 79.
68. Sisco v. Sisco, supra note 29.
69. Ibid.
70. § 516.350, RSMo 1959.
71. Sisco v. Sisco, supra note 29, at 288.
19621
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tween custody decrees and support decrees. Custody proceedings are not subject
to section 516.350, and as to them a court would have continuing jurisdiction and
power to modify. But, since a support decree is subject to the statute and the
judgment is "conclusively presumed to be paid,"72 there is nothing left to be
modified. "To modify a dead thing would be a useless act, and so modification




1. Change in Child's Condition
Modification of a child support decree is theoretically based upon the same
statutory provisions as is alimony. 74 The requirement of a changed condition
must be present, but in this area the courts usually have had little difficulty in find-
ing the change. In Papenberg v. Papenberg,75 for instance, it was said that any in-
crease in the needs of the children is a sufficient change in condition. However, the
basis for finding the change in needs is worthy of note. In the Papenberg case the
trial court had refused to modify. On appeal, the court said:
At [the time of decree] she was an infant three years old. At the present
time Marilyn Gay is sixteen years of age, attending school and, no doubt,
taking part in other activities outside the home which call for a larger
expenditure for clothes and other incidentals. The cost of living has in-
creased materially since the rendition of the original decree. These changed
conditions would justify an increase in the allowance .. .
In Wonneman v. Wonnemann,77 the court again mentioned that the children's
advanced ages and the increased cost of living would require an increase in
payments. It would seem, then, that as long as the children are growing up, with
their living expenses increasing, there has been a sufficient change of condition.
Therefore, in most cases, time alone will be all that is necessary to bring about
the necessity of a modification.
2. Effect of Military Service on Child Support
A mother has been receiving child support payments for her minor son. Then
the son enters the military service. What effect should this have upon the mother's
right to child support? In Swenson v. Swenson,78 the wife sought execution on
her husband's property for child support payments which had accrued while the
son was in the service. The Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed the lower court
72. § 516.350, RSMo 1959.
73. Sisco v. Sisco, supra note 29, at 288.
74. §§ 452.070, .110, RSMo 1959.
75. 289 S.W.2d 468 (St. L. Ct. App. 1956).
76. Papenberg v. Papenberg, supra note 75, at 470. The appellate court re-
fused to reverse, however, because the wife had failed to produce evidence of the
husband's financial ability.
77. Supra note 65.
78. 227 S.W.2d 103 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
[Vol. 27
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and sustained the husband's motion to quash the execution. The wife had ar-
gued that the court's original decree was in full force until modified by the court
pronouncing it.79 The appellate court pointed out that when the boy entered the
military service he became emancipated, and that the emancipation "severed the
filial relationship as completely as if [the child] had become of age."8 Therefore,
while the relationship was severed, so was the father's obligation.
The problem arose again in 1959, in Schaffer v. Security Fire Door Co.-1 In
this case the wife admitted that she had no right to payments for child support
while the boy was in the service (assuming Swenson v. Swenson to be the law),
but requested relief on other grounds. The St. Louis Court of Appeals, however,
refused to accept the wife's concession, stating:
If we accept her concession, we would be holding that a court has juris-
diction to modify retroactively accrued installments of child support.
We do not believe such jurisdiction exists.82
The court then proceeded in detail to argue that courts have no right to tamper
with a wife's vested property interest. But, because of the conflict with the Swen-
son case, the court certified the question to the supreme court for re-examination.
The supreme court sidestepped the issue. The court stated that since the
wife in her brief had unequivocally conceded she was not entitled to payment while
her son was in the army, there was no question of law to be determined. 8 To
make sure that their decision was not interpreted as supporting either side of the
question, the court added:
Our acceptance or recognition of the limitation voluntarily placed by
respondent on her claim does not constitute an approval or disapproval
of any case deciding whether the father is liable for payment to his for-
mer wife for the support of their minor son while that son is in the military
service."s
The solution to this problem will probably depend upon whether the court
feels that the emancipation, operating by itself, should relieve the father's duty.
In considering the question, however, it should be noted that the allowance of such
payments is difficult to justify in view of the purpose of the statutory award.
Payments granted to the wife while she is not supporting the child serve no public
interest, and give no security to the child.
D. Making Payments to the Child
In Steckler v. Steckler, 5 the Springfield Court of Appeals answered, for
the first time in Missouri, the question as to whether a father may credit, against
his ex-wife, support payments made directly to the child. The father alleged that
79. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (1920) (en banc).
80. Swenson v. Swenson, supra note 78, at 106.
81. 326 S.W.2d 376 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959).
82. Id. at 379.
83. Schaffer v. Security Fire Door Co., 332 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. 1960).
84. Id. at 861.
85. 293 S.W.2d 129 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956).
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his daughter had complained to him that she was not getting support from the
mother, and that he began paying the money directly to the daughter. The case
seems to be on sound footing in deciding that there should be no credit.88 The
court stated that such a procedure would create turmoil, and would allow the
father to dictate the manner in which expenditures would be made.
In the court's discussion in the Steckler case it was mentioned that if the
wife were to consent to the payments or expenditures, then the husband could
receive a credit against the amount owing,87 and that "there could be cases where
the consent might be implied from the circumstances."8 This may have been
the problem in Groeller v. Groeller.89 The divorce decree there awarded custody
of the two minor children to the wife, and ordered the husband to pay twenty-five
dollars per week for child support. The facts showed that the husband had been pay-
ing only twenty dollars per week in cash. After eight years, the wife brought garnish-
ment proceedings in aid of execution. In the husband's motion to quash the garnish-
ment proceeding he alleged that, in addition to paying the twenty dollars cash each
week, he had also paid for the children's necessary clothing and medical expenses.
After a hearing on the husband's motion, the garnishment was quashed.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that there
was no evidence that the wife,
either expressly or impliedly, consented to the reduction of the weekly
sum ordered by the court and no evidence to show that she, either expressly
or im-pliedly, consented to the manner in which respondent took care of
the children's needs for medical care and clothing.90 (Emphasis added.)
Yet the husband testified at the hearing that the wife would leave the children
with him nearly every Friday, and pick them up on Monday; that when the
children were sick the wife would bring them to him; and that he averaged approx-
imately 500 dollars per year on expenditures for them. In view of the above tes-
timony it is arguable that the trial court may have determined that consent could
be implied from the actions of the wife, and that the appellate court should have
deferred to these findings.
The appellate court stated that the husband had created the wife's needs by
withholding the five dollars each week; and, if the husband could not afford the
payments, his legal remedy should have been through a motion for modification.9 '
But does not the wife also have a legal remedy for enforcing her rights? And when
she takes the children, in need of clothing and medical care, to their father, does not
she impliedly consent to the aid which he gives?
PAUL JACKSON RICE
86. See 22 Mo. L. REv. 94 (1957).
87. Steckler v. Steckler, supra note 85, at 134.
88. Supra note 85, at 135.
89. 346 S.W.2d 545 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
90. Id. at 549.
91. Id. at 547.
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